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Abstract
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precur-
sor reports “Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-
Distributions” (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) and “Algorithms to Compute
Nash-Equilibria in Games with Distributions as Payoffs” (arXiv:1511.08591v1
[q-fin.EC]) is herein concluded by discussing how to integrate the previously
developed theory into risk management processes. To this end, we discuss
how loss models (primarily but not exclusively non-parametric) can be con-
structed from data. Furthermore, hints are given on how a meaningful game
theoretic model can be set up, and how it can be used in various stages of
the ISO 27000 risk management process. Examples related to advanced per-
sistent threats and social engineering are given. We conclude by a discussion
on the meaning and practical use of (mixed) Nash equilibria equilibria for
risk management.
∗Universita¨t Klagenfurt, Institute of Applied Informatics, System Security Group, Universita¨tsstrasse
65-67, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria. This work has been done in the course of consultancy for the EU
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1 Introduction
With algorithmic matters of game-theoretic risk management being covered in [37], it
remains to discuss a few (among more existing) possibilities of how game models can be
used in risk management.
First, observe that matrix games directly cover plain optimization as the special case
of an either n× 1 or 1×m game. Both have applications in risk management, such as
helping with the following common subtasks:
• If the current security configuration is to be assessed against a number m of (new)
threats, we can think of the defender having only 1 strategy (the current state).
The equilibrium in terms of the -ordering is then the most severe threat (since
the attacker maximizes).
• Likewise, if several options for mitigating a particular threat are available, then
the equilibrium being the -minimum determined by the defender, is the action
leaving the -least damage when being mounted.
• The general case of n > 1 and m > 1 strategies for both, the defender and attacker,
is discussed in the remainder of this article.
Unique Selling Points: The method described in the following offers a variety of advan-
tages relative to the “conventional” approach to managing risks, which is usually tied
to intensive discussion (meetings), and also up to difficult consensus finding. On the
contrary, we propose a method that is based on questioning experts individually, sep-
arately, asynchronously and anonymously, which entails the following features, among
well known improvement of the so-obtained data quality [31]:
1. Distributed expert interviews that do not require to be at a certain room at a
certain time (no meetings), and thus allow provide input in between the normal
workflow (asynchronously to the input of other experts).
2. Since the questioning is done individually, it can be done anonymized. This avoids
social or cultural effects that may change a person’s statement spoken out loud in
presence of certain other people (superiors, subordinates, etc.)
3. Exploitation of matrix organization: it may well be the case that experts are
well informed about certain aspects of a problem, but have no reliable clue on
some other aspects. Polling people by online questionnaires in the privacy of
their own office allows them to answer only those parts of the survey that they
can offer input for, while leaving them a safe way of refraining from answering
other questions. Since our method works on probability distributions, the resulting
dataset from which these are compiled may be richer or sparser, depending on how
many informed opinions are available. In any case, however, asking people face-to-
face in a meeting can bring up an uninformed guess just to have said something,
so that the overall data quality is not necessarily as good as in a distributed and
individual interview.
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4. Enlargement of the opinion pool: without the need for a personal (and confidential)
meeting, people even outside the company can be included in the risk assessment.
For example, matters of reputation can more reliably be assessed by customers
(which are typically not invited to internal management meetings).
5. The use of distributions also avoids problems of consensus finding or opinion pool-
ing (see, e.g., [5, 20] to mention only two out of many publications in this area)
towards a representative number. It is in that sense preserving all information,
since all opinions (all available data) goes into the decision process with equal
weight.
As a final pro that a game theoretic risk assessment allows, it is even possible to offer
the game solution algorithms as a webservice, where the modeling and threat assess-
ment can be left to the customer enterprise. For example, if the client has identified a
set of threats and countermeasures, it will prefer to not disclose this information to a
subcontractor in charge of risk management. Since the game model and solution can be
formulated using abstract names only, it is possible to anonymize the data by letting
the threats be only named “T1”, “T2”, . . . , “Tn”, as well as the countermeasures be
called “C1”, “C2”, . . . , “Cm”. The real meaning of threats and countermeasures can
then remain private information of the company, whereas the game model being given
in terms of these abstract identifiers remains solvable by any third party contractor.
This allows the method to be offered as a (web-)service, without running into troubles
of unwanted information disclose (even the number of threats and countermeasures can
be disguised, if a company adds dummy copies of actions to the list to make it longer
than it actually is).
2 Game-Theory based Risk Management
An eloquent and detailed comparison of how game theory fits into and aids the classical
risk management process has been given by [34]. We follow their presentation hereafter,
while instantiating and adapting the specific steps to the concrete setting outlined in
the precursor parts to this work [35, 37].To get started, consider the classical ISO risk
management process as depicted in Figure 1, and compare it to the workflow to be
completed when a game-theoretic model is to be set up; shown in Figure 2.
The workflow in Figure 2 needs some explanation, in order to establish a mapping
to the risk management process. Perhaps the most important difference between risk
management and game theory is the former being about minimization of losses caused
by a not necessarily rational opponent (nature, but possibly also a hostile party that
has explicit intentions). Contrary to this, game theory in any case assumes a rational
opponent, whose goal is maximizing the own revenue. A conflict/competition arises if the
revenues for both players are negatively correlated, in the extreme case culminating in the
well-known zero-sum competition, meaning “my gain is your loss” (and vice versa). This
is the scenario that we also assume for risk management based on distribution-valued
game theory, although bearing in mind that the incidents that the risk management
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Figure 1: ISO/IEC 27005 Risk Management Process [16]
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Figure 2: Workflow of setting up a Game Theoretic Model (cf. [34])
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refers to may not always follow a hidden rationale or agenda. Nevertheless, the zero-
sum assumption (even though perhaps unrealistic) provides us with a valid worst-case
assessment, and reality can only look better than predicted for the risk manager. The
players engaging in the risk management process may be diverse and many, depending
on the variety of threats to be considered. In mapping this to a game-theoretic model,
we collect all physically existing opponents into a single adversary acting as “player 2”,
against the risk manager, which is player 1. As for the adversary, “player 1” is here an
abbreviation and means the entirety of people engaged in the practicalities (“do”-phase
of the ISO PDCA-cycle) of the risk management. We will hereafter call this player the
“defender”, to ease our wording. Specifically the “do” phase is the one where game
theory can help, since it requires:
• The selection of controls: this is an action undertaken in the final “risk treatment”
phase in Figure 1, and the point where game theory is applied.
• The implementation of controls: while the selection of controls can be based on the
knowledge of an equilibrium, the enforcement thereof (i.e., playing the equilibrium)
corresponds to an optimized implementation scheme. We will revisit this issue later
in sections 6.4 and 6.3.
• The definition of measures to check their effectiveness: the measures per goal are
the assurances defined in [35, Def.4.1].
So, all these actions can be supported by game theory. To make this precise, let us look
at the steps numbered in Figure 2, and to be completed for each player:
3.1: each player has some a-priori or current knowledge when a decision is made. In
classical game theory, the next action depends only on the current state of the
game (in a generalization to stochastic or sequential games, a dependency on past
game iterations is included; we discuss one such example in Section 5.1). In the
reality of risk management, external need to be considered, and the player’s action
is hardly dependent on the current state of the system only (at least because the
system state may not even be known precisely at all times). For this reason,
the theory developed in [35],unlike classical game theory, allows uncertainty to be
explicitly modeled at this stage, and incarnate through the payoffs of an action
that we describe below.
3.2: strategies for a player refer to everything that can be done in the current position.
In fact, if the game play covers several stages until the payoff is received, then the
strategy is an exact prescription of what is to be done at each step. In that sense,
it is comparable to a “recipe” that the player can follow to accomplish the desired
goal. Mapping this to a practical setting, the strategy may be named “patch
machine X”, whereas its details relate to all the steps taken from the current state
of machine X until the point where the patch has been installed and the machine
is put back to work. Likewise, a strategy for the opponent (player 2, adversary)
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may be high-level named “hack machine X”, where the details of this strategy may
include a sequence of steps such as “sending a phishing mail” → “connect to the
malware” → . . .
3.3: Identify the interests of a player and define measures of “fulfilment” of these needs.
In our case, this process refers to the identification of goals that are object of the
risk management. Examples include (but are not limited to): economic, reputa-
tion, people, information, capability, etc. (see [45]). The degree of achievement
in each of these goals must be measured on a scale that makes the different goals
comparable, and for technical reasons also arithmetically compatible. The easiest
way of assuring this is to define a common set of discrete risk categories, with in-
dividually specific meanings per security goal. This has several advantages beyond
pure theoretical reasons, as it “equalizes” the understanding of risk valuations and
the taxonomies in which risk and outcome of actions is expressed. This is the
fundament to the next step 3.4.
3.4: Preferences of the players are found by asking how the players valuate an outcome.
For general games, this has to be done for each player. In our case (and every
zero sum game), it suffices to ask only player 1 (the defender) for this valuation,
in each scenario. By construction, we specifically allow an outcome of a specific
scenario of strategies for the defender and the attacker to be rated in various re-
spects, i.e., in terms of each security goal. Having a common vocabulary (set of
risk categories) in which the risk in each goal is expressed, the underlying theory
of multi-criteria optimization meaningfully applies and helps optimizing the ac-
tions towards maximizing the security goal fulfilment (equivalently, minimize the
residual risk).
3.5: the representation of preferences by a utility function is –in classical game theory
– done by specifying a function ui : PS1 × PS2 → R for the i-th player, so
that each scenario of defense (action from the list PS1 of available options) and
attack (action from PS2, i.e., possible exploits) is rated in some real-valued score.
The construction in [35]deviates from this definition in allowing the outcome to
be not crisp but a random probability distribution, thus the function ui takes
the form ui : PS1 × PS2 → F, where F is the set of all probability distributions
(more precisely their density functions) that satisfy the regularity conditions (lower
bounded by 1, absolute continuity w.r.t. Lebesgue or counting measure; see [35]).
The crux of this modification is that:
• Letting ui be valued in terms of probability distributions offers a powerful
model to capture uncertainty (cf. our remarks in step 3.1 above).
• The specific definition of ui can be made based on empirical statistics; that is,
we can simply collect many domain expert opinions on a specific scenario from
(d, a) ∈ PS1 × PS2, and define the value u1(d, a) as the empirical histogram
of this expert survey (we expand this approach below in section 3.3). This
has a neat effect, since it:
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– Preserves all information provided by the experts
– Avoids a consensus problem that would normally arise from the need
to agree on a single representative opinion about the risk. In practice,
people may be unsure and disagreeing to the opinion of others, so that
conflicts and aggregation of opinions may be required. In letting the risk
valuation be an entire histogram, each input goes into the assessment
with the same weight, so that no domain expert is “overruled” or has less
influence than any other.
If the system response dynamics is known, on the other hand side, then there
may not even be a need to poll experts, and a simulation of the outcomes
under the specific scenario (d, a) could be imaginable. Percolation theory [22]
offers one way to do this (among other possibilities).
In assuming a zero-sum competition and a two-player game, the risk management
process outlined here is asset-centric. This is an important core philosophy of the
entire process, since the overall goal is not about preventing all possible threats, but
about making an attack non-economic for the attacker. This is the main point of applying
optimization (i.e., game theory) here, since we seek to minimize our own losses (measured
in terms of the values of our assets), against whatever an attacker may do.
The mapping sketched in Table 1 has been adapted from [34], but needs a bit of
tailoring towards defining an analogous process based on distribution-valued games (and
the theory thereabout). Specifically, the risk assessment phase (Figure 1), comprising
risk identification, risk estimation and risk evaluation, refers to the current state of the
system, whose valuation may trigger further action (implementation of controls) in later
phases of the process (namely the risk treatment).
In Table 1, the process of determining the current state is only briefly mentioned as
adding a strategy “do nothing” to the game, which merely models the possibility of the
situation at hand being satisfying already. Here, we will resemble the classical process of
risk management to a wide extent using only the idea of an outcome valuation in terms
of probability distributions, which is made possible by the -ordering on these objects
that was invented in earlier stages of the project. This extends up to the point where
risks are evaluated, which is normally done using a 2-dimensional risk matrix, typically
with colored entries like shown in Figure 3. The (specification of the) elliptic region
displayed on the upper right corner is the main output of the risk evaluation, which
establishes a priority list of risks and divides the threats into those that demand action
(i.e., which are put into the critical region based on their impact and likelihood) and
those who do not demand immediate actions (i.e., which lie outside the critical region).
In the original ISO/IEC process, the risk value is computed as the product risk =
likelihood × impact. It is popular to define a categorical scale for both, the likelihood
and the impact (in tabular form explaining what exactly is meant by a “medium likeli-
hood” or a “medium impact”; section 3.8 gives examples). Multiplying the ranks (i.e.,
category numbers1) then gives the risk score and delivers the coloring of the risk matrix
1it is advisable to avoid using the number zero as a category number or rank, as it would cancel out
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ISO/IEC Process/Terminology Game theoretic step/terminology
Context
establish-
ment
Setting the basic criteria Defining the scope
and boundaries Organization of an informa-
tion security risk management (ISRM)
Scenario investigation (scope definition and
asset identification) Player identification
(mostly assigning the role of the defender).
Risk iden-
tification
Identification of assets Included in the scenario investigation
Identification of existing controls Identify implemented controls, i.e. “do noth-
ing” option for the defender.
Identification of vulnerabilities Options that can be exploited by threats. In-
cluded while determining the strategies of the
attacker (player 2). We denote this list as
PS2.
Identification of consequences Identify how players value multiple aspects of
outcomes. Identify preferences (i.e., priorities
among different security goals)
Risk esti-
mation
Assessment of consequences Define a common scale and ranking scheme
for all relevant outcomes.
Assessment of incident likelihoods Computed likelihoods for each strategy for
both players.
Level of risk estimation (list of risks with
value levels assigned)
Expected outcome for each scenario. This ex-
pected value (a real number) is in HyRiM re-
placed by an entire distribution function (thus
avoiding information loss due to a “represen-
tative” centrality measure like the average).
Risk evalu-
ation
List of risks prioritized Prioritize the expected outcome for both of
the players
Risk treat-
ment
Risk treatment options are risk reduction, re-
tention, avoidance and transfer
Strategies (control measures) for the defender
can be categorized into “static” (changes ap-
plied to the system that have a permanent
effect, e.g., installation of intrusion detection
systems) and “dynamic” (actions that need to
be repeated in order to retain their effect on
security, e.g., security awareness trainings).
The entirety of controls available is denoted
as PS1.
Residual risks Expected outcome of the game. In HyRiM,
this is the equilibrium value distribution, from
which all statistically meaningful quantities
can be computed. For example, the mean of
this outcome distribution would correspond
to the classical quantitative understanding of
risk as the product of likelihood and impact.
Since HyRiM admits multiple goals to be op-
timized at the same time, the residual risk is
returned per security goal. The theory coined
this output artefact “assurance”, and it is one
probability distribution for the losses in each
relevant security goal.
Risk accep-
tance
List of accepted risks based on the organiza-
tion criteria
Strategies of the defender (based on the orga-
nization criteria)
Risk com-
munication
Continual understanding of the organization’s
ISRM process and results
Strategies of the defender
Risk moni-
toring and
review
Monitoring and review of risk factors Risk
management monitoring, reviewing and im-
proving
The process is repeated as the player’s options
and their outcome valuation may change
not included Information gained by the opponent
not included Beliefs and incentives of the opponent
not included Optimization of the strategies
Table 1: Mapping between ISO/IEC 27005 Risk Management and Game Theoretic Ap-
proach (cf. [34])
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Figure 3: Risk Matrix (example)
as exemplified in Figure 3. Note that loss valuations based on crowd sourcing (expert
surveys, detailed in section 3.3) in fact embody both, the impact (as is directly asked
for), and the likelihood (as the relative frequency of answers provided by the set of ex-
perts polled) in one object. That is, the classical two-dimensional matrix depicted in
Figure 3 would boil down to a 1-dimensional list of threats, which can plainly be sorted
in -ascending order. Thus, the risk evaluation is even simplified in our setting here.
It may nonetheless be advisable to resemble the classical process of risk management a
little closer by asking for both, the impact and the likelihood, and construct empirical
distributions for both. This may be useful in letting the expert express his beliefs more
detailed than just asking for a possibility (and not for a probability too). We revisit this
issue later in section 4, after having established the basics of this process first.
In generalizing this classical approach to risk management to a more sophisticated
technique based on games and distributions as risk representing objects, our main target
in the next section will be modeling the losses as probability distributions, and how
to prepare the game theoretic models for the risk treatment phase, when the games
are to be solved and “played” in practice. We will exemplify the modeling based on
two examples, which are advanced persistent threats (APTs), covered in section 5.1,
and social engineering, discussed in section 5.2. Once the cycle in Figure 1 has been
completed for once, any repetition entailing another round of risk estimation and risk
evaluation can be supported by exactly the same kind of game-theoretic models that were
used in the previous risk treatment phase (in fact, the equilibrium strategy enforced as
result of the last risk treatment phase is the “do nothing” strategy in the next risk
assessment; cf. Table 1). Examples of potentially suitable models are described in the
sections to follow. Section 6.3 discusses how to use the game analysis results for effective
improvements and control selection.
any rating in the other aspect. Indeed, we have adopted such an assumption quite explicitly already
by declaring loss random variables (or categories) to be ≥ 1 in any case; see [36].
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3 Modelling Losses
The proposed method of risk modeling is here based on non-parametric loss models, for
their conservation of information and absence of perhaps difficult to verify assumptions.
Nonetheless, actuarial science knows important applications of parametric loss models,
which we briefly discuss in the next section.
3.1 Parametric Loss Models
The weight of a distribution’s tails is what makes it (in)appropriate for risk management,
where distributions with heavy, fat or long tails are common choices. In the continuous
case, extreme value distributions (Gumbel, Frechet or Weibull) are suitable choices,
as well as stable distributions. The latter, despite not having analytically expressible
densities except for special cases, can nevertheless be ordered upon using sequences of
truncations or moment sequences (if they exist) [37].
In the discrete case, the (a, b, 0) or (a, b, 1) class of distributions may be considered,
with a density in the former class being defined recursively as Pr(X = k) = Pr(X =
k−1) · (a+ bk ) for k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The (a, b, 1) class is – roughly speaking – the truncated
version of an (a, b, 0)-density excluding the possibility of the event X = 0. It can be
shown that the former class includes exactly three families of distributions, which are
Poisson, Binomial and the Negative Binomial distribution.
A general issue with parametric losses is their representation of an arbitrary amount
of information by a fixed number of parameters. This inevitably incurs a loss of infor-
mation, and calls for partly sophisticated methods of parameter fitting or similar. On
the contrary, nonparametric losses like (the previously proposed) kernel densities come
with the appeal of preserving all information upon which they are constructed, as well
as offering the flexibility of allowing for adjustments to model uncertainty in the expert’s
answers more explicitly. An example of this will be sketched in section 3.7.
Nonetheless, if a parametric model should be used, then one should bear in mind
that risk is intrinsically a latent variable, and the best we can do is relate it to some
observable variables. Unfortunately, the usual assumptions on the latent variable being
dependent on the hidden variable, so that an inference towards risk is possible, may not
directly apply to a risk assessment process. Risk is a property of some general entity,
action, intention, or similar. As such, subjective assessments of it are made by humans
whose risk perception may be correlated (to a degree that depends on the skill level of
the person in the respective regard) but not directly influenced by the true underlying
objective value of the risk variable. Still, algorithms like expectation-maximization [27]
could (and should) be assessed for the extent to which they can deliver a useful risk
model. Indeed, the result of an EM-algorithm being a distribution model over latent
variables together with a point estimate on its parameters is a perfectly suitable input
for the decision models put forth in the precursor parts of this report.
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3.2 Nonparametric Loss Models
Parametric models come at the cost of information loss due to representing the entire
data by a (preferably small) set of parameters to the distribution. This is the price for
analytic elegance and the ease of many matters related to working with such models
practically.
In light of the scarceness and inconsistencies in the data to be expected in a risk
management application, we may thus look at nonparametric loss models as a poten-
tially interesting alternative. The method of choice here will follow the proposals made
in [37].Specifically, we will start from an empirical distribution compiled from expert
interview data, and use a kernel density estimator for our loss model. Moreover, we
will focus on discrete risk assessment scales, which lead to discrete (in fact categorical)
empirical distributions. For a kernel density estimator in this context, it is somewhat
surprising that the literature is unexpectedly thin on discrete kernel density estimates.
Besides only a few proposals found in [6, 24, 33], the problem of “good” kernel density
estimation seems to be as much of an art (on top of science) as it is in the continuous
case. Hence, we will continue defining our own discrete kernel proposal based on Gaus-
sian densities, but postpone the details until later, when we have specified the process
of data collection, which obviously goes first.
3.3 Collecting Data from Experts
As for every empirical study, the first step is fixing the details of the scenario about
which experts are to be interviewed. In our context, this may entail the identification of
a particular threat and related countermeasures. The high level description of a threat,
say “unauthorized access to server X”, must here be followed by a sequence of possible
detailed suggestions on how the respective attack could be mounted. For the aforemen-
tioned example, possibilities include the exploitation of (known) vulnerabilities (up to
zero-day exploits) in the server itself, social engineering, theft of access credentials, or
similar. Normally, each of these possibilities is matched with a respective countermea-
sure. Risk management standards like ISO 27000 [15, 17] or related ones [4] provide an
indispensable source of threats and countermeasures, which can be used in this step.
Abstractly, let us think of this process having brought up a list PS1 of countermea-
sures, opposing a list PS2 of possible threat scenarios (the acronym PS means “pure
strategy”, as a reminder that we are approaching a game-theoretic model here).
The lists PS1 and PS2 can be assumed to be quite short (though they must be
comprehensive; ideally exhaustive) in practice, and each scenario (d, a) ∈ PS1 × PS2
of “defense (d)-vs-attack (a)” can be put to its own individual review (not necessarily
independent of other scenarios, but the design of questionnaires and the amount of
context specification in there is a different and nontrivial story of empirical science not
subject of this report).
Remark 3.1 (Simultaneous Occurrences of Multiple Scenarios) Note that the mod-
eling so far implicitly prescribes the assessment to be done relative to a specific single
threat. This restriction can be dropped in presenting the expert a set of threats and
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explicitly allowing for several of them to occur at the same time. At first glance, this
would exponentially enlarge the list PS2, this combinatorial explosion can be avoided
by allowing the expert to name multiple possible loss categories with different likelihoods.
That is, the expert may center the thoughts around a specific threat, but may take further
considerations of coincidental other incidents into account in saying that, for example,
• losses of category x are most likely,
• while losses of the larger category y > x remain possible if two or more incidents
occur at roughly the same time.
If several such possibilities are uttered, they are most conveniently described by a distri-
bution supported on (at least) the anticipated loss categories x and y.
To set up the empirical game theoretic model, let us therefore assume that one scenario
(d1, d2) has been specified in detail, say (for illustration)
d1: perform periodic updates
d2: exploit some software vulnerability
It goes without saying that this specific (example) scenario appears (if at all) in the
middle of a real-life APT, as the earlier stages are usually matters of social engineering
to make an initial contact and infection. We will go into details of this in section 5.1,
and keep our example abstract here only for the sake of illustration.
The goal of data collection is getting a payoff matrix composed from loss distributions
that can be used with the game theoretic framework defined in the preceding reports
[36, 37].Figure 4 displays the workflow to fill in one cell in the payoff matrix, which is
basically done along four steps:
1. Selection and specification of a scenario (di, dj) ∈ PS1 × PS2 as a questionnaire
presentable to experts (the wording and style of the questions is itself a highly non-
trivial matter, and should be done w.r.t. the subsequent implementation strategy
for the optimal defense. We will revisit this issue later in section 6.5),
2. Doing an expert survey on the effectiveness of countermeasure di against attack
dj . It is crucial for this survey to clearly define at least the following items:
• the context of the risk assessment (that is, the aspects that are relevant and
those that are irrelevant for the risk assessment)
• a clear definition of the scale in which the risk is quantified (in the style of
Table 2 shown in section 3.8 or similar).
3. Collecting as much expert input as possible to define an empirical loss distribution
Lˆij over the categories as specified in the survey.
4. Preparing the loss distribution for a subsequent game-theoretic analysis.
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Figure 4: Setting up a Matrix Game with Uncertain Payoffs from Expert Questionnaires
The details of step 1 are individually dependent on the application context, i.e., are
specific for the system or infrastructure under investigation. This step is recommended
to be done according to established standard procedures as described by ISO 27000 or
its relatives. Step 2 is a matter of empirical research and questionnaire design. The
literature on this is rich, and this task should be left with experienced staff educated in
empirical research and statistics. On the technical level, collecting the data is relatively
simple, since it is an easy task to set up an online survey, displaying a sequence of
questions asking the expert to give her/his risk rating on each described scenario. Things
may be even made more efficient by showing the expert the entire matrix, asking to enter
a risk assessment in each cell (showing yet another combination of defense and attack),
and to leave all fields blank for which there is a lack of domain knowledge or no justified
opinion can be expressed.
Step 3 deserves some attention, as this involves an a-priori agreement on the loss
categories to be used in the survey. We give details on this in section 3.8.
The final preparation of loss distributions in step 4 is a matter of kernel smoothing,
and described in section 3.10.
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3.4 Refining the Expert Survey
Note that the expert survey – in the form described – only asks for possibilities and
not for probabilities. That is, the expert is only questioned to state an expectation of
outcome, rather than telling how likely s/he feels it to be. If the survey is refined to ask
for a likelihood in addition (as is prescribed in the conventional ISO/IEC risk manage-
ment standards), then we end up with two probability distributions, one for the impact,
the other for the likelihood. A “multiplication” of these two objects, to resemble the
usual formula “risk = impact × likelihood” underlying quantitative risk management,
is theoretically possible (as a multiplication of the hyperreal representatives), but not
practically meaningful. If the two distributions are available, then a lexicographic com-
parison of (impact, likelihood) or (likelihood, impact) may be the more reasonable way
to go. However, an explicit advantage of the expert surveys and using distributions
as representative objects is them embodying both, impact and likelihoods within the
same loss distribution object, thus the expert interviews are greatly simplified over the
standard risk management process.
3.5 Outlier Elimination
It is important to note that any survey data should be cleaned from outliers, and there
has to be a consensus on the treatment of missing values. Either is up to a variety of
statistical methods and the particular method should be chosen in light of the given
application.
The discussion here is only meant to bring this point to the attention of the reader,
and will not go into details of how this could be done.
3.6 Harmonizing Risk Attitudes
After having cleaned outliers, it remains to “harmonize” different kinds of answers de-
pending on the individual personalities and risk attitudes. Persons known to be risk
averse will tend to overestimate the risk, while risk seekers will tend to underestimate.
It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss concrete methods to correct risk estimates
based on a respective classification of the individual, but it is important to bear in mind
methods of statistical classification as a potential toolbox to help in this regard.
3.7 Using the Bandwidth Parameter to Model Answer Uncertainty
In some occasions, it may happen that an expert is unsure about whether or not certain
circumstances enable certain damages. For example, if the question of whether an inci-
dent at one point in the system can cause damage at another point in the system can
be answered with “generally no, except for some rare cases”, then the risk assessment
related to the incident will have its modal value at a low category, but – due to the
possibility of the incident being nonetheless severe – extends the distribution up to the
full range of loss categories. The bandwidth parameter of the kernel density estimate
can be increased to let the density put more weight on far away categories, or be chosen
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smaller when the certainty about the assessment (rareness of the incident), is better. In
any case, the choice of bandwidth for the kernel density estimates gains another dimen-
sion of importance as being a parameter to control/describe the expert’s certainty in the
data.
3.8 Defining Risk Assessment Categories
It is crucial (not only for technical reasons) that all loss distributions for all goals in a
multi-goal security game must be defined on the same categories. This can be justified
by technical but also interpretative reasons:
Technical reason: the procedure to numerically compute multi-goal security strategies
(MGSS) relies on casting the multi-criteria objective function (vector-valued) into
a scalar that is a weighted sum. This transformation requires “compatible” objects
to be weighted and added (see [37]), which calls for the same underlying scale in
all goals.
Interpretation: comparing the severity of damages in two security goals is only mean-
ingful if the goals are quantified in the same terms. That is, the understanding
of, say “high” damage has to be fixed for all goals, and must not be left to a
subjective idea that is individual for each expert (otherwise, the outcome of any
such assessment is useless). This is especially relevant for non-numeric goals like
the reputation of an enterprise, customer trust, or similar.
Especially to address the latter, it appears advisable to underpin the survey/question-
naire by an a priori fixed definition of categories in which the risk assessment shall be
made. This can be done in tabular form where each goal is assigned a column, with rows
corresponding to the categories, and cell entries describe the meaning of a risk category
specifically for each goal. Table 2 shows an example, whereas it must be stressed that
the concrete content of the table must be adapted/tailored to the practical situation at
hand.
Such a table should be displayed together with the survey, to equalize the expert’s
individual understandings of the risk categories, and to harmonize the resulting data.
The loss categories actually used with the model are simply the integers 1, 2, 3, . . ., noting
that the number 0 is precluded as a category (in order not to violate the assumptions
made in [36]).
3.9 Using Continuous Scales
If the loss is measured in continuous terms, then a common categorization like outlined
above must be replaced by a “meaningful” common (continuous) risk range. The ex-
act definition of “meaningful” must herein be made dependent on the context of the
problem, so that all security goals (losses) homogeneously cover the range without being
concentrated in disjoint regions. We illustrate the issue with two examples, one showing
how it should be done, the other illustrating the problem:
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risk category
(numerical
representative)
loss category
loss of intellectual prop-
erty
damage to reputation harm to customers . . .
negligible (1) < 500 e not noticeable none . . .
noticeable (2) between 500 e
and 10.000 e
noticeable loss of cus-
tomers (product substi-
tuted)
inconvenience experienced
but no physical damage
caused
. . .
low (3) > 10.000 e and 50.000 e significant loss of cus-
tomers
damages to customers’
property, but nobody in-
jured
. . .
medium (4) > 50.000 e and 200.000 e noticeable loss of market
share (loss of share value
at stock market)
reported and confirmed
incidents involving light
injuries
. . .
high (5) > 200.000 e
and 1 Mio. e
potential loss of marked
(lead)
reported incidents involv-
ing at least one severe in-
jury but with chances of
total recovery
. . .
critical (6) > 1 Mio. e chances of bankrupt unrecoverable harm
caused to at least one
customer
. . .
Table 2: Potential (Example) Definition of Risk Categories for different Security Goals
Example 3.2 (well chosen loss range) Consider two loss variables, with are mon-
etary loss due to theft of intellectual property, and (monetary) investments to protect
these assets. Since security is primarily not about making an attack impossible but only
about making it non-economic, it can be expected that both losses range in roughly the
same numeric region. Formally, let R1, R2 be the two random loss variables, and let
ε > 0 be a small value for which we truncate both distributions F1, F2 at their respective
(1 − ε)-quantiles, denoted as q(1−ε)(Fi) for i = 1, 2. Call the so-obtained loss ranges
I1 = [1, q(1−ε)(F1)] and I2 = [1, q(1−ε)(F2)]. If I1 ≈ I2 (i.e., q(1−ε)(F1) ≈ q(1−ε)(F2)),
then we may take the convex hull of I1 ∪ I2 as the common loss range, and be sure that
the comparativeness of the two loss variables is retained and reasonable.
Example 3.3 (badly chosen loss range) Let R1 ∼ N (5, 1), R2 ∼ N (900, 100) be two
random losses with Gaussian distributions. As before, if the modeler chooses the range
as the (convex hull) of the union of both (truncated) ranges at some (1 − ε)-quantile,
the game may be defined over losses within the common range [1, 1000] (for ε = 0.027,
the range µ ± 3σ covers ≈ 99.73% of the cases for the Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ);
our cut off here is at µ + 5σ, and thus covers more than 99.9%). Since R2, however,
assigns most of its mass in the region [800, 1000], it will always (at least up to reasonable
numerical precision) be -larger than R1, so the optimization is pointless.
To avoid situations like sketched in Example 3.3, (at least) two options are available:
1. Rescaling of all loss ranges to a common region. Continuing example 3.3, this
would mean replacing R2 by
1
90R2 ∼ N (10, 100/(902)) ≈ N (10, 0.012346).
2. Defining a common continuous scale with the same intended usage as the discrete
categories. That is, if a continuous loss rating is permitted, we may define it within
a common interval from [1, 10], allowing any value to be picked by the modeler, as
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long as it is within the range. This may be the method of choice if the modeling
interface displays a “slider” where a user can drag the gauge at any position on a
continuous scale to express the (subjective) belief about the loss.
3.10 Preparing the Loss Model
In [37], the theoretical possibility of convergence issues in the game’s analysis (by fic-
titious play) was anticipated, occurring when the loss distributions do not share the
same support (this adds to the technical justification stated in the previous section 3.8).
Practically, this is highly likely to occur due to missing data. If some categories are
simply not being used (either because of an unsuitable definition or because the scale
is fine-grained so that not all levels are being used by the experts), then the loss model
may be empirically correct, but not useful with a subsequent numeric analysis.
The solution in the continuous case was a kernel smoothing, technically a convolution
with a Gaussian density, to extend all loss distributions until a common end of their
support (previously called the cutoff point) is reached. We will do the same thing in
the discrete case, using a kernel obtained from discretizing the Gaussian distribution.
To this end, define f(x) := (1/
√
2pi) exp(−12x2) as the density of a standard normal
distribution, and for every h > 0, define the kernel function Kh : Z→ R as
Kh(n) :=
1
h
∫ n+ 1
2
n− 1
2
f(t/h)dt,
where h is the bandwidth parameter (as familiar from continuous kernel density esti-
mates). Obviously,
∑∞
n=−∞Kh(n) =
1
h
∫∞
−∞ f(t/h)dt = 1 and K ≥ 0, so K defines a
discrete probability mass function on Z. Moreover, it is easy to see that for every h > 0,
the function Kh resembles a discrete version of a Gaussian density, so that by letting
h→ 0, Kh degenerates into a discrete Dirac mass,
Kh(n)→
{
1, if n = 0;
0, otherwise.
(1)
If we call Fˆn a general empirical distribution function (defined on any subset of Z)
obtained from n data points (answers in the expert survey). The convolution Fˆn ∗Kh
is another distribution function supported on all Z, i.e., (Fˆ ∗Kh)(n) > 0 for all n ∈ Z.
Moreover, in letting h→ 0, we have the pointwise convergence (Fˆ ∗Kh)(n)→ Fˆ (n) for
all n ∈ Z, so the estimate is asymptotically correct (note that in contrast to Nadaraja’s
theorem, we do not even need to assume a specific speed of decay when letting h→ 0).
This convergence easily follows from (1). The same result equivalently holds if we replace
f by a truncated version fˆ thereof (being supported on [1, a] for some integer a > 1),
leading by disretization to the truncated kernel Kˆh. In the following, we thus consider
the smoothed empirical distribution Fˆn,h := Fˆn ∗ Kˆh, noting that this also pointwise
converges to Fˆ and that the support (strictly) covers the full interval [1, a]. However
now, we can make a stronger convergence statement: let F be the (unknown) distribution
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of the loss assessment, which is approximated by the expert data2, which is F . We can
write ∣∣∣Fˆn,h − Fˆn + Fˆn − F ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Fˆn,h − Fˆn∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Fˆn − F ∣∣∣ (2)
To the first term, we can apply a uniform bound thanks to the supports of Fˆn,h and Fˆn
being all finite, which is
sup
∣∣∣Fˆn,h − Fˆn∣∣∣→ 0 as h→ 0,
as is an easy consequence of the equivalence of all norms on R. The other term in (2),
we can apply Glivenko-Cantelli’s theorem to conclude the convergence
sup
∣∣∣Fˆn − F ∣∣∣→ 0, as n→∞,
so that sup
∣∣∣Fˆn,h − F ∣∣∣ → 0 in the limit h → 0 and n → ∞. Note that this argument is
only good for plausibility of our approach, but cannot be taken as a proof of correctness,
since practically, it still relies on an infinitude of data, which – more crucially – must be
objectively sampled from the real loss variable (having the distribution F ).
On the bright side, however, the proposed smoothing enjoys a nice intuitive justifica-
tion as accounting for uncertainty in the assessment.
Example 3.4 Suppose an expert utters the opinion that, on a scale from 1 to 5, the risk
is 3. Despite that a middle assessment is an implicit statement of uncertainty already3,
there statement “the risk score is 3” is not equivalent to the statement that the risk
cannot be anything else. In other words, there may be admitted chances of the damage
being higher or lower than the average told by the expert. To express such uncertainty
more detailed, the expert may admit possible outcomes on the entire range 1, . . . , 5, with
the initial assessment being just the most confident outcome.
Of course, it will not be feasible to ask experts to provide entire probability distribu-
tions over a scoring scale, but the smoothing of the empirical distribution by convolution
with Kh achieves the same thing. Viewing Kh as a set of weights associated with all
possibilities around the mean value x, the expert assessment x ∈ Z receives the max-
imal weight (as being the modal value of Kh), whereas all other possibilities receive a
nonzero weight that decays with the distance to the value x. Graphically, this process
thus “fills” all empty bins in the empirical histogram (say, if a category has never been
2We somewhat sloppily assume here that the experts provide us with “observations” about the real
random loss X having the distribution function F . This assumption is clearly not correct, but still
the best that can be done, given that we cannot simply wait for losses to occur, as this would probably
kill the enterprise much before a decent lot of data about the true loss distribution could have been
obtained. Thus, we have to live with overly trusted experts providing us with “objective” samples of
the unobservable loss variable distributed like F .
3This is usually avoided by choosing a risk scale with an even number of categories to avoid having the
median on the scale.
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Figure 5: Effect of smoothing the histogram to fill empty categories and extend the
support
assigned during the expert survey), and additionally extends the distribution up to the
full and identical support for all loss distributions. Hence, besides satisfying the tech-
nical constraints imposed, the smoothing naturally accounts for the uncertainty in the
assessment; the lower the parameter h is, the more confident we are in the assessment
(i.e., the closer the smoothed approximation Fˆn,h approaches Fˆn). Figure 5 displays an
example of the original empirical histogram (Figure 5c), and its smoothed version with
h = 1, having its gaps filled in by the superposition of smoothing kernels (expressing the
uncertainty around the modal values given in Figure 5c), and another smoothed version
of the histogram with a much smaller bandwidth parameter h = 0.25. This plot visually
illustrates (confirms) the formal claim of convergence as stated previously.
The quality of the kernel density estimation, as in general with this nonparameteric
method, is the art of choosing the bandwidth parameter h. Various rules of thumb (e.g.,
Silverman’s rule [43]) or cross-validation techniques may be applied. Since there is no
generally “best” way to choose this parameter depending on the information at hand,
we refer to the literature on nonparametric statistics for concrete methods [8, 47,49].
4 Risk Prioritization
Let us assume that a total of m threats T1, . . . , Tm has been identified. If, say n, experts
provide their input on the impact and likelihoods (both artefacts obtained by surveys
as outlined in section 3.3), then it is a simple matter to compile an empirical histogram
(a distribution FI) for the impact and another empirical histogram (a distribution FL)
for the likelihood. In doing so for every threat T1, . . . , Tm, we end up with 2m such
distributions, which we denote here as F(k, I), F(k, L) for the k-th threat Tk in the list.
To resemble the risk matrix familiar from the standard process of risk management,
we can use the -ordering on the distributions (remember that it is a total order), to
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Figure 6: Risk Matrix using -Orderings
separately sort the threats T1, . . . , Tm in ascending -order according to their impact
and likelihood. This gives two lists, in which each threat gets a rank assigned among the
total of m threats, say the k-th threat has rank ri on the impact ranking and position rj
on the likelihood ranking. The risk matrix familiar from the ISO processes (cf. Figure
3) is then re-established by placing each threat into a 2D-coordinate system with the
x-coordinate being the rank on the impact scale and the y-coordinate being the rank
on the likelihood scale. This puts each threat to a particular position on the grid, and
we may then proceed “as usual” by coloring the area as we would do for a normal risk
matrix. Likewise, the “critical region” can be defined as the area inside which threats
fall that need to be addressed by the subsequent risk management process. Figure 6
displays an example.
The main difference to the standard risk matrix is herein twofold:
1. While a standard risk matrix has axes scaled in categories, the so adapted risk
matrix has axes scaled in ranks that go from 1 to the total number m of threats.
2. The consensus problem of assigning a threat a single quantification in terms of like-
lihood and impact is avoided. Since many experts can utter disagreeing opinions,
all of which go into the impact- and likelihood-distributions FI and FL with equal
importance. The total ordering  then assures somewhat like a “base-democratic”
ranking, since one threat outranks the other in the -ordering, if more people clas-
sify the impact, respectively the likelihood, as high (see [37] for the full detailed
effect of this ordering).
If the assessment considers multiple criteria, say, if the impact is not only measured
in money but also in reputation, then the respective assessments are made separately
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(not necessarily independently) from one another. For the example of budget-impact
and reputation impact, we could think of the one distribution FI as being replaced by
two new distributions FBI and FRI (for budget and reputation). Likewise, if two threats
have assessments in these terms, given as F(BI,1), F(BI,2) and F(RI,1), F(RI,2), then we
ought to rank the two in terms of two criteria. A canonical way of doing that is offered
by defining a game with two goals (“budget” and “impact”), and using one (dummy)
strategy for player 1, and letting the two threats being the strategies for the opponent
(player 2). It is, however, important to stress that we cannot directly go ahead and set
up a multi-criteria (1× n)-game to get the most severe threat via an equilibrium, since
the gameplay is defined to be among n+ 1 players, where each opponent (corresponding
to a goal) plays independently of all others. The equilibrium would then return a worst-
case threat identified per goal, which is possibly not what we seek here for a multi-criteria
risk optimization. The theory, however, remains applicable when the game is reduced
to a two-player (1 × n) game with scalar(ized) payoffs per player. In that case, the
equilibrium is necessarily pure and indicates the worst case threat for player 1. The R
package implements this method in a designated procedure preference:
# ranking if there is only one goal (say, FBI1, vs. FBI2)
> preference(FBI1, FBI2)
2 # this means that the second parameter (FBI1) is preferable
# ranking, if there are multiple goals (of equal importance)
> preference(list(FBI1, FRI1), list(FBI2, FRI2))
# Let us assign twice as high priority to the "reputation"
# goal by supplying the parameter weight=c(1,2), i.e. "goal" has
# priority 1, and "reputation" has the (double) priority 2.
> preference(list(FBI1, FRI1), list(FBI2, FRI2), weights=c(1,2))
The results directly gives the desired ranking by telling that either the first (output
“1”) or second (output “2”) threat is less severe; if the function returns zero, then the
distributions are identical and the decision is indifferent. For three or more threats, the
procedure can be repeated pairwise to rank a whole set of threats in the way as described
above.
5 Examples of Game-Theoretic Modeling
5.1 Modeling APTs
The investigation of many examples of advanced persistent threats (APTs) reported in
the past reveal a common structure underlying an APT, even though the details thereof
may be highly different. Quoting the taxonomy of [7], an APT roughly proceeds along
the following steps:
1. Initial infection:
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a) reconnaissance: information gathering,
b) development: design of a made to measure malware,
c) weaponization: preparing the trojan and droppers,
d) delivery: transmission into the victim infrastructure, e.g., by a phishing email,
or similar.
2. Learning and propagation: repeated sequence of
a) exploitation: to get deeper into the system
b) installation: to leave artifacts and backdoors for an easy return later, and
destroy footprints of the attack
3. Damage:
a) command and control: interaction with the victim system’s compromised
resources via previously left artifacts
b) actions on the target: causing the actual damage
The specific actions taken in each of these phases depend on the target infrastruc-
ture and no general description is possible due to the diversity of such infrastructures.
However, specific examples can be “read off” reported prominent incidents, such as in-
cluding Stuxnet [10], Duqu [2], Flame [28], and Aurora [23]. A common element in all
these appears to be the human factor, which we discuss separately in section 5.2.
Game theory has been applied in various ways to model attacks and cyber risks [9,25,
50] and proposals (independent of game theory) include moving target defenses [18,19],
trust mechanisms [48], and defense-in-depth techniques [30]. Here, we will review a
recent proposal to model APTs as a sequence of games, each of which is tailored to the
specific nature and details of the respective phase.
That is, an APT usually begins with a harmlessly looking email or “lost” USB stick,
on which malware enters the system. Alas, nowadays attackers have joint forces into
an entire illegal business sector covering the entire supply chain of cyber crime in a
spectrum of independently offered services (often referred to as “cybercrime as a service”
in alignment to cloud computing terminology). This means that the person identifying
a weakness is not necessarily the same who is writing the exploit for it. Likewise, the
author of the exploit kit is not necessarily applying it anywhere, but merely sells it to
the actual attacker. Similarly, infections with malware are not automatically intended to
cause immediate damage. The term “botnet-as-a-service” describes the business model
of infecting a large number of machines and offering to deploy malware on these zombies
upon request and for a (smaller or larger) fee. In this way, the attacker can simply “buy”
access to a potentially large number of infected machines instantly. For the victim, this
has the unpleasant effect of the infection remaining stealthy and inactive, until some time
later, when the outbreaks causes noticeable damage. At this time, however, it is most
likely that no connection between a past email and the current incident is recognized.
The exact time window between an infection and its activity is also dependent on the
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technical countermeasures adopted in the specific company. For example, signature-
based malware recognition (like classical anti-virus software used to work) may take a
couple of days until the malware is recognized as such and the respective signature is
shipped with the next update. On the contrary, cloud based malware detection that
is based on recognizing a huge lot of “identical” email (attachments) suddenly flowing
through the internet can have a much shorter time (even a few hours) until a malware
is suspected and classified. So, the time window between the infection and the exploit
may, in some cases, be closed quite fast (by a good malware recognition system).
To model a so-structured APT in terms of games, the first step is listing all potential
ways into the system, such as include (but are not limited to):
• (spear) phishing, whaling,
• waterholing,
• tailgating,
• etc.
The entirety of these possibilities makes up the set of strategies PS2 for the attacker.
Typically, an entry in PS2 is thus not constrained to have a specific form or structure
(in particular, an element x ∈ PS2 is not a purely mathematical object but rather a
description of how an attack would be launched according to this particular strategy x).
In a different view, PS2 can be considered as a list of threats, to which corresponding
countermeasures can be defined (appealing to catalogues found in standards like ISO
27000, etc.). The list of countermeasures is PS1.
Note that PS1 and PS2 should be defined bearing in mind the steps and structure
of the first phase of the APT, which comprises information gathering, development,
weaponization and delivery. Consequently, example defense measures in PS1 may relate
to periodic (and random) re-configurations of the system in order to thwart the attacker’s
respective next steps, either by invalidating so-far collected information or by removing
malware by coincidence, say if a computer is reinstalled or privileges of the victim user
have changed (were revoked).
In any case, let the game describing the initial infection be a matrix game G1 (where
the subscript is a reminder of this being the first phase of the APT). It appears fair to
let this be a matrix game (static and repeated), since if the game is expectedly repeated
either in case of an attack failed, or to infect further parts of the system, if an attack
was successful.
Let the equilibrium computed for the infection game G1 be the pair of distributions
(F ∗1 , F ∗2 ), where the optimal defense against the initial infection is the distribution F ∗1
(the distribution F ∗2 , more specifically, its probability mass function can be taken as a
non-unique indicator set of neuralgic points in the infrastructure).
To model the next phase of learning and propagation, we divide the (physical) in-
frastructure in stages that the adversary needs to reach one by one in order to get to
the inner target asset. If the infrastructure is a network graph G(V,E), then the target
asset may be a(ny) fixed node v0 ∈ V , and the i-th stage can (but does not need to) be
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Figure 7: Topological Vulnerability Analysis Example
defined as the set of nodes at distance i to the node v0. That is, the stages are “concentric
circles” around the asset, and on each stage, the adversary plays a (different) game to
get to the next stage. A single such stage is penetrated by the aforementioned steps
of exploitation and installation, continuing with exploitation again on the next stage
(only in a different setting there). This modeling is practically supported by topological
vulnerability analysis (TVA), which can cook up an attack graph for an infrastructure.
In the following, we will illustrate our thoughts based on Example 5.1.
Example 5.1 (based on [44]; see also [40]) Consider a system as shown in Figure
7b, composed from three devices, with various ports opened and services enabled. Based
on this information, the attacker can consider several exploits, such as:
• FTP- or RSH-connections from a node x to a remote host y, hereafter denoted as
ftp rhosts(x,y), and rsh(x,y), respectively.
• a secure shell buffer overflow at node y, remotely initiated from node x, hereafter
denoted as sshd bof(x,y).
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Table 3: APT scenarios (adversary’s action set PS2, based on Figure 7)
1 execute(0) → ftp rhosts(0,1) → rsh(0,1) → ftp rhosts(1,2) → sshd bof(0,1) →
rsh(1,2) → local bof(2) → full access(2)
2 execute(0) → ftp rhosts(0,1) → rsh(0,1) → rsh(1,2) → local bof(2) →
full access(2)
3 execute(0) → ftp rhosts(0,2) → rsh(0,2) → local bof(2) → full access(2)
4 execute(0) → rsh(0,1) → ftp rhosts(1,2) → sshd bof(0,1) → rsh(1,2) →
local bof(2) → full access(2)
5 execute(0) → rsh(0,1) → rsh(1,2) → local bof(2) → full access(2)
6 execute(0) → rsh(0,2) → local bof(2) → full access(2)
7 execute(0) → sshd bof(0,1) → ftp rhosts(1,2) → rsh(0,1) → rsh(1,2) →
local bof(2) → full access(2)
8 execute(0) → sshd bof(0,1) → rsh(1,2) → local bof(2) → full access(2)
Table 4: Security controls (selection) – subset of PS1
countermeasure comment
deactivation of ser-
vices (FTP, RSH,
SSH)
these may not be permanently disabled, but could be temporarily turned off or
be requested on demand (provided that either is feasible in the organizational
structure and its workflows)
software patches this may catch known vulnerabilities (but not necessarily all of them), but can
be done only if a patch is currently available
reinstalling entire ma-
chines
this surely removes all unknown malware but comes at the cost of a temporary
outage of a machine (thus, causing potential trouble with the overall system
services)
organizational precau-
tions
for example, repeated security training for the employees. These may also have
only a temporary effect, since the security awareness is raised during the train-
ing, but the effect decays over time, which makes a repetition of the training
necessary to have a permanent effect.
• local buffer overflows in node x, hereafter denoted as local bof(x).
Each of these may establish a trust relation between two nodes x and y, which we denote
as trust(x,y). The list of attack strategies to penetrate all the stages until full access
to machine 2 is a matter of plain path enumeration in the attack graph, whose results
are shown in table 4.
A selection of respective countermeasures is given in table 4.
The game to model the penetration can then be defined per stage by defining the
machines 0, 1 and 2 as stages, where machine 2 is the inner assert (node v0 in our
previous wording), and a stage is the game played to establish a trust relation between a
machine at distance i and one at distance i− 1 to machine 2.
In the (quite simple) infrastructure of Figure 7a, the stages would thus be:
• stage 1 (distance 1 to machine 2): {router}
• stage 2 (distance 2 to machine 2): {file server (machine 1), firewall}
• stage 3 (distance 3 to machine 2): {workstation (machine 0)}
The game played at stage 3, accordingly, has strategies equal to all exploits that can be
mounted on the workstation (machine 0), which can be read off the TVA attack tree
(Figure 7b) as PS2 = {ftp rhosts(0,1), ftp rhosts(0,1), sshd bot(0,1)}. The
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corresponding set PS1 comprises all countermeasures that can be implemented (such as
virus checks, temporary disabling of services, but also non-technical ones like repeated
security training, etc.). The strategy spaces PS1 and PS2 identified in this way then
define the shape of the respective 3rd stage game G3, whose payoff structure is to be
defined following the procedure outlined in section 3.3; Figure 4.
The games for the other stages are constructed analogously.
Given a game for each stage, we can connect them into an overall model for phase
two of the APT by adopting a high level perspective. In each stage, the adversary has
basically two options, which are:
1. penetrate: this means launching an attack as identified based on previously gath-
ered information (cf. example 5.1), or
2. stay, to collect more information while remaining stealthy → learning.
Both options can be modeled using their own (distinct) game models, and the connection
between the games over all stages is established by considering that in the n-th stage
game (whether we go for penetrating or staying), the outcome is one of the following:
• if the attacker decides to penetrate, then
– it may succeed, in which case it enters game Gn−1, or
– it may fail, in which case it has to repeat game Gn once more.
• if the attacker decides to stay, then
– it may succeed and gain further information, but this leaves the attacker in
this stage n,
– it may fail, in which case the overall game terminates, and the entire invest-
ment of the attacker is lost (we model this as a negative gain for the attacker).
Likewise, the defender has the option of defending (without any guarantee of the
defense being successful), or not defending. The latter strategy is implicitly played
whenever the defender “pauses” in its defense, say, if the security guard is being sent
elsewhere and misses the attack by this unfortunate coincidence. In any case, “do not
defend” is never a dominating strategy and occurs only due to resource limitations and
the inability to defend everywhere at all times against everything.
Writing I(n) for the payoff (to the adversary) in the n-th stage, the above modeling
yields a 2 × 2 zero-sum matrix game structured as shown in Figure 8 (cf. [41]). In this
model, we have additional quantities p(n) and q(n) that depend on the current stage,
and quantify the likelihood for each action to be successful. These values can be either
defined directly, or themselves be derived as saddle point values of classical 0-1-valued
matrix games in each stage (in this case, the risk assessment is done in binary terms
only asking the expert for whether or not the attack will be successful).
It is reasonable to assume a circular structure in this game (cf. also [1]), which amounts
to a single unique equilibrium, for the following reasons:
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````````````defender
attacker
penetrate stay
defend p(n) · I(n− 1) + (1− p(n)) · I(n) q(n) · I(n) + (1− q(n)) · (−I(n))
do not defend I(n− 1) I(n)
Figure 8: Sequential 2-Player Game Model for Advanced Persistent Threats
• if “defend” is a dominating (row) strategy, then either “stay” or “penetrate” will
complete this into an equilibrium, and there is nothing to be optimized by game
theory here on this (higher) level.
• if “do not defend” is a dominating (row) strategy, then there is no need to do any
active security here, as the infrastructure is already secure anyway.
• if “penetrate” is a dominating (column) strategy, then the obvious best choice is
to defend, which again degenerates the game into a trivial matter.
• if “stay” would be a dominating (column) strategy, then there is no need to defend
anything, since the attacker is not trying to get to the asset anyway.
In any case, it is a simple (yet laborious) matter of working out the game matrix for
each stage, and determine an equilibrium for it (say, using fictitious play as described
in [37]). The particular equilibrium obtained for the n-th stage is the distribution I(n),
telling us the distribution of damage in that stage, accompanied by optimal defenses in
this stage (obtained from the 2×2 game and the inner sub-games played for penetration
and to collect information during a stay).
Concluding the idea, the decomposition of the learning-and-penetration phase in the
APT life cycle into stages and corresponding games played therein delivers an in-depth
defense action plan (individual randomized defense actions being taken on each part in
the infrastructure), as well as a higher-level risk assessment I(1), I(2), . . . that refers to
each stage. The distribution I(n) for the n-th such stage then indicates the likelihood
of damage suffered at the n-th “protective layer” around the asset of interest.
The final game modeling the Damage-phase of the APT can then be defined similar to
the initial infection game G1, as the attacker may simply try and retry causing damage.
The process and steps to identify possible actions and countermeasures must again be
supported by special purpose (and application specific) tools and expertise, but the game
theoretic treatment and computation of risk metrics remains the same. Thus, we will
not repeat the details here.
A Static Game Model for the Penetration Phase In a more simplified view towards
a substitute of the sequential phase two game, a static game model can be considered
as an alternative (being easier to model and more efficient to analyze computationally).
This simplification is bought at the cost of getting a more coarse-grained model, since
the attack and defense strategies are defined more “high-level” and not specific for each
stage in the graph representation (of the infrastructure or the attack tree).
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As before, we can think of the attacker working its way through the stages, while
occasionally being sent back or kicked out if a security officer (perhaps unknowingly)
closes some of the backdoors established previously. The pure strategy set PS1 for the
defender is thus the set of all nodes/components in the system on which spot checks (e.g.,
malware scans, configuration changes, updates, patches, etc.) can be done. Different
to the per-stage game modeling from before, the defenses now correspond to high-level
attack strategies PS2 that describe only techniques but are not specifically tailored to a
particular machine. That is, PS2 would be composed from a more generic set of threats
like
• buffer overflow exploits,
• cross-site scripting,
• code injections,
• etc.,
but unlike in Example 5.1, these attacks would not be considered on specific machines.
Rather, the attack scenario is described as a general code injection that may be tried on
any machine in the network (if possible). The description of the attack/defense scenario,
as well as the possibilities to consider for a risk assessment may be more complex in this
kind of modeling, as Example 5.2 shall illustrate.
Example 5.2 The expert survey would ask something like:
What is the expected damage if an attacker attempts a code injection attack
in our infrastructure, while machine 1 (see Figure 7a) is being re-installed at
roughly the same time.
To answer this question towards a loss estimate, the expert may consider the following
aspects:
• Which machines could be vulnerable to such an attack (say, which of them are
accessible by a web interface or maybe have an insufficient patch level, etc.)
• Depending on which machine is attacked, the damage may be more or less (thus
allowing the expert to utter multiple possibilities; substantiating the construction
of a categorial loss distribution once again).
• Depending on where the spot check is done (say, on machine 1 in Example 5.1),
three cases are possible:
– Machine 1 has so far not been reached by the attacker (more precisely the
attack path), so the reinstallation has no effect on the APT at this stage.
– Machine 1 is exactly the one currently targeted by the attacker. This may
render the results of the APT learning phase on this machine useless, since
the configuration has changed. Consequently, the attacker is sent back one
stage and has to restart learning from here.
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– Machine 1 has already been infected with malware, so that the adversary’s
backdoor path goes through it. In that case, the attacker’s secret backdoor
may be closed by the reinstallment and the attacker is again sent back to a
previous stage.
Since there is uncertainty on where the attack may be mounted, and also on the current
position of the adversary, the expert may utter several possibilities in one of two ways:
• Tell about a set of possibilities, expressing the likelihood for each of them individ-
ually. For example, the expert may say something about the most likely outcome,
but in addition also say that more or less extreme results are possible with certain
other likelihoods.
• Give a most likely outcome r, and express the uncertainty about it: this in fact
corresponds to the aforementioned kernel density smoothing, since the uncertain
variation around the most likely value (as expressed by the expert) may be well
expressed by a bell-shaped curve centered around the value r. This is nothing else
than a kernel density, where the uncertainty is “quantified” by the parameter h.
In repeating the procedure exemplified in Example 5.2 for each (high-level) defense/at-
tack scenario (di, aj) ∈ PS1×PS2, we end up with a standard matrix game defined with
probability-distribution valued payoffs, which are now defined not on the risk categories,
but on the graph theoretic distances, or more specifically, the stages between the initial
infection and the inner asset. Picking up Example 5.1, there are three stages which
the attacker has to proceed through, and the loss distribution defined per defense/at-
tack assigns likelihoods to each of these stages; Figure 9 displays an example. The
game-theoretic optimization then goes for pushing the probability mass towards “more
remote” nodes in the network (or attack graph). That is, we will try maximizing the
distance between the attacker and the asset, measured as the number of hops (= stages
in our wording) that need to be taken to reach the goal. The stage numbering should,
for consistency with the minimization, be increasing from 1 up to the stage where the
asset is, i.e., stage 1 should comprise the outermost perimeter, followed by the adjacent
inner nodes, until stage N > 1 being the set of final nodes adjacent to the target asset.
5.2 Modeling Social Engineering
Social engineering is a good example of a case where the distribution-valued game-
theoretic framework perfectly fits. Since there is hardly any technical countermeasure
against such attacks, and the exploits are based on psychological principles of human
behavior, there is also an element of “forgetting” that makes security awareness decay
over time. For this reason, security training, information campaigns and similar must
be repeated from time to time, and there is never a guarantee that any of these precau-
tions has any or even durable effect. Both of these reasons render matrix games with
distribution-valued payoffs into a nice model, since:
• the necessity of repeating social engineering awareness training corresponds with
the modeling assumption on the matrix game to be repeated.
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Figure 9: Example of loss distribution on stages (phase 2 of an APT)
• the finiteness of matrix games corresponds to the limited set of possible counter-
measures known against such attacks. That is, we cannot ask an employee just to
become “creative” in how social engineering may be detected, and the best we can
hope for is a feasibly small set of recommendations that a person can remember
to avoid falling victim to social engineering.
• the inevitable element of human error renders the outcome of a social engineering
scenario in any case up to randomness. Hence, our specification as a distribution-
valued matrix game appears as a good fit, as it allows us to classify social en-
gineering countermeasures as being “variably effective” (taking into account the
differences in people’s personality, daily mood, current workload, technical skills,
time since the last security awareness training, and many more).
For a pure model of social engineering attack/defense scenarios, the questionnaire
outlined in section 3.3 may be adapted to poll people about their awareness against
social engineering, describing the particular attack scenario in the description of the
question, and asking the employee on how he/she would behave in this scenario. The
results then equally well compile into the sought loss distributions, if each answer in the
multiple-choice survey has a background association with a predefined loss category (cf.
section 3.8).
A different approach to account for social engineering when it comes to loss distribu-
tions is considering these attacks as methods to establish the initial infection in an APT
model as outlined in section 5.1. Here, we would include social engineering techniques
in the attacker’s strategy space PS2, and the specification of the respective success rates
can be done using the same kind of survey as before. The resulting game then already
models the first phase of an APT infection, in giving the probability for a social engineer-
ing attack to succeed under the given security awareness campaign (which is a mixed
strategy over PS1 in the sense of repeated randomly selected trainings, information
broadcast, etc.).
The second phase of the APT, the penetration, can as well use social engineering
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techniques to overcome barriers within the system. Suppose that a subnetwork, for
security reasons, does not have any physical or logical connection to the outside or
any other intranet within the company. Then a malware can jump over this physical
separation by a bring-your-own-device incident. That is, if the malware gets into the
system by someone connecting a virulent USB stick to the inner separated network, the
infection has effectively overcome the logical separation. Even more, this scenario may
start from within the company’s perimeter, since the infection of the USB stick may
indeed happen on an employees’ computer, which has a connection to the internet and
got infected in the first phase.
The respective loss distributions associated with such an infection outbreak can ef-
fectively be constructed by simulation, as is eloquently outlined in [22]. We leave the
details aside here.
6 Working with Game-Theoretic Risk Measures
The description in the following is based on the previous explanations about the model,
and therefore only discusses practical matters of choosing the parameters and hints on
how to interpret the results. A description on how to do the calculations with aid of the
R statistical software suite is given in section 6.4.
6.1 Choosing the Cutoff Point
So far, we mentioned the necessity of truncating distributions only as a technical matter
of assuring convergence. As such, the point a > 1 at which the payoff distributions are
truncated (for a compact support) also influences the outcome of the game, since the
equilibria depend on it. Indeed, the practical choice of a can be made in light of how a
determines the -relation among the payoffs. Informally, Lemma 4.4 in [37] tells that 
is decided based on how the payoff densities behave in a right neighborhood of a. That is,
the setting of the value a controls the range in which damages are considered as relevant
for , whereas damages far lower than a become less and less relevant for the -relation.
This means that the choice of a can be made to implement a risk prioritization in the
model in a sense that is perhaps best illustrated by an example (cf. also [38] for a related
yet different illustration):
Example 6.1 Suppose an enterprise has backup capacities to bear losses less than 50.000 e.
Then, we may set the truncation point a := 50.000, so that the entire probability mass
assigned to damages > a is “squeezed” underneath the distribution on the interval [1, a].
Consequently, if a loss model F1 admits highly likely losses > 50.000 e (i.e., has in that
sense a fat tail) will result in a higher value of f1(a) than maybe the alternative loss dis-
tribution F2, assigning smaller likelihood to such incidents (and in turn coming out with
a smaller density f2(a)). Thus, f1(a) > f2(a) will make F2 -preferable over F1 [37].
The dependence of the resulting equilibrium is best visualized by taking another exam-
ple of a 2× 2-game with continuous payoff distributions as shown in Figure 10. Taking
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the cutoff point a = 10 results in a pure equilibrium (x∗,y∗) = ((1, 0), (1, 0)), while
truncating the distributions at a = 6 changes the equilibrium into a mixed one, namely,
(x∗,y∗) = ((0.751, 0.249), (0.531, 0.469)). Both of these have been obtained using ficti-
tious play as described in [37] taking 1000 iterations.
6.2 Interpretation and Meaning of Equilibria
The difference in the equilibria computed for the previous examples is immediately
understood by looking at the way how  depends on the truncated distribution’s tails
(cf. [36, 37]): if the cutoff point a is chosen so large that the likelihoods assigned to
events around a are approximately equal, then there is no point in frequently switching
strategies for either player, since the outcome under any of the four scenarios admitted
by the example 2 × 2-game is roughly the same. Hence, the equilibrium is “purified”
by the choice of the cutoff point. Conversely, if the cutoff point a is chosen so that the
masses that accumulate around it are significantly different, then mixed equilibria may
arise.
This has a twofold and partly positive consequence for the risk manager, since:
• the practical choice of the cutoff point a can be made to mark the region in which
risks are considered as relevant. That is, if there is an agreement that damages
beyond some threshold value are highly relevant, while everything below it is only
of secondary interest, then the cutoff point a can be set to exactly this threshold
value. More importantly, any such setting is not even to be taken as sharp, since
what determines the -relation is the left neighborhood of a, so the transition from
the domain of acceptable risks to the area of critical risks is somewhat smooth.
For example, if the risk management is done in terms of a CVSS scoring, then the
risk manager may fix the convention of not caring about vulnerability scores in the
range around 2, but certainly action is demanded for scores above 7. In that case,
we would set the cutoff point to a = 7, in which case the game optimization focuses
on scorings of 7 or (slightly) less, while the region around scores of 2 becomes
relevant only upon equiprobable ratings of all defense actions on the range (2, 7].
This effect holds in general and is not limited to the example games here. In fact,
the cutoff point creates a qualitative difference to conventional optimization, where
the numeric magnitude of the goal function is irrelevant for the maximization. This
may not practically be the case, but can be accounted for by setting the cutoff point
accordingly.
• An equilibrium must in any case be interpreted relative to the cutoff point. If a can
reasonably/meaningfully be chosen so that pure (or approximately pure) equilibria
arise, then these greatly ease matters of playing the equilibrium. That is, if the
risk prioritization results in almost all actions ending up with approximately equal
likelihoods in the relevant neighborhood of a, then practically playing the optimal
behavior is easy, since the best response is no longer randomized.
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Figure 10: Payoff structures with different cutoff points
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Risk vs. Goal Prioritization: The role of the cutoff point in risk prioritization must be
distinguished from the role of the weights (discussed in [37, Sec.4.5.1]) assigned to reflect
the priorities of different goals in an MGSS. In fact, this is a different degree of freedom,
and goal priorities (the weights αi for i = 1, 2, . . . , d goals can be chosen independently
of the cutoff parameter a).
6.3 Optimizing an Infrastructure’s Resilience (Risk Treatment)
If the line between threats that need to be addressed and those that can be left aside
(for the moment) has been drawn, i.e., the risk evaluation phase is completed, the risk
treatment concerns the selection of controls to mitigate the threats.
Given one or more threats to be addressed, risk treatment is about selecting controls
against them. The particular selection of controls and resource allocation is a matter
of optimization, and this is where game theory comes into play. Specifically, it helps to
determine the optimal style of implementing controls towards minimizing the risks. The
procedure, on a high level, is defining a game matrix that has a list PS2 of adversary’s
actions (typically the threat or a set of threats to be considered), and another list PS1 of
controls that address the threats. Note that the setup of the game matrix, specifically the
definition of PS1 and PS2 should be made with care: it may well be the case that some
controls in PS1 may not address certain threats in PS2 and vice versa. For example, if
we have the countermeasures
• d1 ∈ PS1: “installing an intrusion detection system”
• d2 ∈ PS1: “install more fire extinguishers”
And the threat list PS2 includes
• T1 ∈ PS2: fire outbreak
• T2 ∈ PS2: hacking attack
Then it is obvious that d1 is pointless against T1 and d2 has no mitigating effect on
T2. In such cases, one may consider a clustering of threats and controls based on their
mutual relevance. This amounts to selecting specific controls against specific threats,
and allows an optimized control selection “per threat” or “threat group” (if a control is
effective against more than one threat). Once the lists PS1 and PS2 have been specified,
it pays to sub-classify the actions in PS1, as there are:
Static controls: these have a permanent effect in being a change to the system structure.
Their selection must be based on the goal of finding the minimal set of controls
that covers the maximal spectrum of threats. If several candidate controls are
available, then the problem is “game-theoretic” in the sense of being a humble
optimization for the defender having n strategies against a specific single strategy
of the attacker (that is the threat to be mitigated). If all threats shall be mitigated
at the same time, then the problem of control selection can be set up as a matrix
game, where n controls are available against m threats. The resulting equilibrium
consists of three output artefacts:
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1. A probability distribution x∗ over the n controls
2. A probability distribution y∗ over the m threats
3. An equilibrium payoff distribution V
Each of these is meaning- and useful, because:
• All controls having a nonzero probability assigned by the equilibrium distri-
bution x∗ must be played for risk minimization. Thus, these controls need
to be implemented. Note that the magnitude of the probability is herein not
relevant, but can be taken as an indication of importance of the respective
countermeasure. For example, if the games equilibrium prescribes to “play”
the strategy “install another firewall” with likelihood 0.3, then it is obviously
meaningless to install a firewall only to an extent of 30%. Nonetheless, it
tells us that this control must be installed at all. However, if the firewall
installation gets a likelihood of 0.3, and another control, say “change pass-
words” gets a likelihood of 0.6, then this indicates that both of these measures
must be implemented, but changing the access credentials (or enforcing this)
should go first, as it is the more frequent (thus more important) strategy in
the equilibrium.
• The likelihoods of different threats can be taken as an indication of “how
likely” a threat is in the worst case. This indication must, however, be in-
terpreted in light of the non-uniqueness of equilibria, which entails that the
computed distribution y∗ is indeed a worst case scenario, but there may be
(many) others too.
• The equilibrium payoff distribution V quantifies the residual risk remaining
after the controls have been implemented. If, say the average (mean value)
of V turns out to be not satisfying, then the entire selection process may be
repeated (in Figure 1, this is risk decision point 2, where the process may be
restarted from the “establish context” phase.
Alternatively, we can ask for the smallest set of countermeasures that are simul-
taneously effective against all threats. Given the information of which defense
measure is effective against which threat (in the form of a set Si of candidate
countermeasures for the i-th threat), the problem is to compute a hitting set for
the family {S1, S2, . . .}. That is a well-known problem and can be solved using
linear optimization, or more direct algorithms found in the literature.
Dynamic controls: these have a volatile effect and need to be repeated, such as patching
and security awareness trainings. The latter is also an example that justifies the
approach of letting the outcome of a control being uncertain and in fact quantified
by a probability distribution. In case of a security awareness training, this distri-
bution could reflect the (relative) amount of people that are (afterwards) highly
aware, medium aware or even remain unaware despite the training. In any case,
the outcome is never certain and depends on the person and its background. The
second example of patching equally well justifies the modeling of outcomes with
36
probability distributions: patching may be prescribed, but the patch may be un-
available at the current time, or it may not help against the right vulnerability. So,
the outcome of “patching” is also uncertain and the model put forth in [36] explic-
itly accounts for this. The selection and implementation of such dynamic controls
works as for the static controls described before, but with an important difference
in the use of the artefact distribution x∗: this is a randomized prescription telling
the frequency of how often a control is repeated. That is, if a control, say “patch-
ing”, gets assigned a probability of 60% by x∗, then the implementation is done
as follows: on each day, we toss a biased coin, coming up heads with a chance
of 60%. If it does so, the administrator is told to look for and install a patch.
The other days, no patching is done. This example is of course oversimplified, but
shall illustrate the “security-by-randomness” approach that game theory enforces:
security against the attacker is gained by it not knowing the current patch level
reliably (as the patching can happen every day), so anything that the attacker has
been learned so far may soon be invalidated, and hence the system is more secure.
A Purely Combinatorial Selection Technique: A different selection method for risk
controls is offered by the methods of model-based diagnosis (MBD) [42]. In a nutshell,
MBD (as put forth in [13, 42]) offers a systematic way of testing the effectiveness of
subsets of PS1 against subsets of PS2. The goal is finding a minimal set of actions in PS1
that address all threats in PS2. More formally, let there be a relation  ⊆ PS1 × PS2,
with the semantics that
d1  d2, if and only if defense d1 is working against threat d2.
Conversely, if some defense action d1 is useless against threat d2, then (d1, d2) /∈ .
Using this relation, we can associate each threat with countermeasures relevant to it,
giving a family of sets as
P := {{di ∈ PS2 : di  t} : t ∈ PS1} ,
i.e., an entry in the family P is a set Ci := {di1 , di2 , . . . , dik} of all k countermeasures
that are effective against threat di ∈ PS2.
The sought optimal selection of controls, a diagnosis in the terminology of [42], is a
minimal hitting-set D for P. Minimality can here be understood by cardinality or in
terms of ⊆-relation, so that no smaller set than D is a hitting set (this is the usually
preferred setup). By definition, a hitting set D has the property of intersecting every
element in P (formally, D ∩ Ci 6= ∅ for all Ci ∈ P). Again, interpreting this in our
context, this means that the selected security defense measures in D effectively address
all threats in PS2 (this is the hitting-set property), and any proper subset of these
controls would leave at least one threat untouched (this is the ⊆-minimality).
Computing hitting sets is a simple matter of setting up a linear integer constrained
optimization problem, or possible by direct computation and heuristics. We leave the
computational details aside here, except for the final remark that the problem of comput-
ing minimal hitting sets is NP-hard in general (see [21]). This is why a game-theoretic
method may be more efficient and hence preferable here.
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6.4 Software Support
The entire theory outlined up to this point has been implemented as a package for
the R-system [32], named HyRiM [39]. Plots and results given to illustrate matters in
the following have all been obtained using this implementation, and we will give the
respective call sequence (on the R shell) here in a condensed form that may serve as an
example-based tutorial for applying the theory elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the implementation mentioned here cannot be a substitute
for the entire risk management process as outlined in section 2. Duties of context
definition, infrastructure modeling, threat identification and listing of defense actions
should be subject of extensive use of established (relevant) software tools and standards
in this context. Vulnerability scanners like Nessus [46], reporting tools like Cauldron [26],
or tool support to work with the ISO or BSI standards family are strongly recommended
in these initial phases of the risk management process.
1. Assume that the expert opinions are available as a numeric vector obsij containing
all the answers for the scenario (di, dj) ∈ PS1 × PS2. That is, obsij is a vector
of integers in the range {1, 2, . . . ,M}, where M is the maximum value (for our
examples, we took M = 10).
Given a distinct such vector obsij for each i, j, we can compile a loss distribution
by the call:
fij <- lossDistribution(obsij)
This produces a continuous loss model as displayed in Figure 10. A visualization
as in this figure is obtained by either plotting a single loss distribution
plot(f11, cutoff=6)
(in which the parameter cutoff is optional and defaults to the maximum observation
in the data from which the loss distribution has been constructed), or by plotting
the entire game matrix by calling:
plot(G, cutoff=6)
where the parameter cutoff is again optional and, if supplied, is passed to the inner
plots of the payoff distributions.
Assume that the previous step has been repeated to construct continuous loss
distributions f11, f12, f21 and f22. Discrete loss models (with smoothing) can be
obtained by telling lossDistribution to come up with a discrete model. This is
done by adding an according flag, and (optionally) supply a bandwidth parameter
(which if omitted, defaults to Silverman’s rule of thumb, applied to the data is if
it were continuous):
fij <- lossDistribution(obsij,discrete=TRUE,supp=c(1,10))
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The parameter supp is supplied as a reminder (also for the user) that all loss
distributions need to have the same support (otherwise, the construction of games
upon a set of distributions with different supports will fail with an error message
reported).
2. From the (continuous) loss models l11, l12, l21 and l22, we compile the MGSS
by an invocation of:
G <- mosg(n = 2, m = 2,
losses = list(f11, f12, f21, f22),
goals=1,
defensesDescr = c("d1", "d2"),
attacksDescr = c("a1", "a2"),
goalDescriptions = c("goal"))
in which the textual descriptions of the strategy spaces PS1 and PS2 are optional
and insignificant for the subsequent analysis (they only show up in plots).
3. Given the game object, we can call mgss to give us a security strategy. This
function takes the cutoff point as a direct parameter, which if omitted, defaults to
the right end of the (common) support of all distributions (no truncation):
mgss(G,T=1000,cutOff=6)
Here, the parameter T is the number of iterations to the FP algorithm.
The final result returned by mgss is an object of class mosg.equilibrium, and contains
the following fields:
• $optimalDefense: an n-dimensional column vector with rows labeled by the
names of the entries in PS1 (parameter defensesDescr in the previous call to
mosg).
• $optimalAttacks: an m-dimensional column vector with rows labeled by the
names of the entries in PS2 (parameter attacksDescr in the previous call to
mosg).
• $assurances: a list of mosg.lossDistribution objects (similar as returned by
the lossDistribution function used to construct the game structure). They
can be plotted (see Figure 10 for examples), printed in detail (using the summary
function), and related statistical quantities can be worked out such as:
– probabilities for individual attacks (probability mass function can be evalu-
ated by the generic function density)
– the cumulative distribution function cdf
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– moments (of given order, returned by the function moment), mean, variance
and quantiles (at given levels, returned by the generic function quantile).
For example, after having computed an equilibrium in our generalized setting, a simple
numeric risk measure according to the rule “risk = damage× likelihood” can be recovered
by invoking
mean(eq$assurances$goal)
which gives the assured expected loss (= usual quantitative risk) in the first security goal
(g1) of the game. If, besides the mean, the risk manager is interested in the expected
variation around the mean, then it is an easy matter of computing the variance of the
assured loss distribution as
variance(eq$assurances$goal)
Finally, if the risk manager is interested in the chances of suffering losses of categories
“high” or above, he/she may invoke the cdf function in the proper way. For example, if
category “high” has the number 4, then the chances of getting such a loss or more are
given by
1 - cdf(eq$assurances$goal, 3)
Conversely, computing quantiles tells the losses expected up to a, say 95%, chance. That
is, calling
quantile(eq$assurances$goal, 0.95)
tells us the maximal loss (category) that occurs in 95% of the cases.
6.5 Playing the Equilibrium Strategies
To cast frequencies from the game into a practical project plan that tells the security
officer when to take which action, let us fix a particular action and call p its equilibrium
frequency, given the time unit (e.g., one month). The number of actions per time interval
T is therefore p · T and in fact is a Poisson distributed variable with rate parameter p.
In turn, the time between two actions is exponentially distributed with parameter 1/p.
So, if we are at time t0, the next repetition of the action should be at time t0 +∆, where
∆ ∼ Exp(1/p) is an exponentially distributed random variable and measured in the unit
of time that was fixed before. Sampling exponentially distributed variables is easy using
uniformly distributed random numbers in the unit interval. Given such a random value
U ∼ Uniform(0, 1), we simply compute ∆ = −p · log (U) to have ∆ ∼ Exp(1/p).
Note that this method yields the desired fraction of actions (events) per time unit,
which is only correct if the gameplay is presumed with a periodicity taking time T .
Thus, the rating of strategies (the questionnaire; cf. section 3.3) should be done bearing
in mind the game period T .
For example, if the defense is a security awareness training, and the unit of time T is
one month, then the threat assessment could ask something like:
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Consider an employee whose last security awareness training happened no
more than a month ago. How likely do you think is this person plugging a
virulent USB stick into her/his computer at work?
A game-theoretic treatment of risks using actions that need repetition will return
likelihoods for each action to occur (in an optimal defense strategy). Repeatable actions
correspond to repeatable and independent game repetitions. To make this semantically
sound, we thus need to make the assessment in light of the game’s periodicity, to decide
whether or not it is necessary to take a particular action again. Returning to the previous
example of security training, we certainly will seek to avoid having such training every
month, but the optimal periodicity of the action is far from obvious. A game-theoretic
analysis will deliver a frequency of training, counted over the repetitions of the game. If
we – hypothetically – let the game duration be one month before the next (hypothetical)
iteration starts, then the question of the effectiveness of a security training must refer
to the current period, which lasts no more than one month up back in time. Hence, we
get the proposed question sketched above.
7 On Model Validation and Verification
It lies in the nature of risk management that there is no such thing as a “rollback” that
could reset a company into the state before an incident, to verify if the here proposed
decision framework or another would have delivered the better outcomes. The same
problem is very well known from other fields of science, and clinical studies tackle the
issue by introducing control groups to be able to clearly relate observed effects to the
treatment rather than coincidence (or a placebo effect).
Things are no different in the area of risk management, except perhaps at increased
complexity and difficulty. In a famous quote, George Box is telling us that essentially
all models are wrong, but some are still useful. His point is definitely right, but it must
not be taken as an excuse to not ask for the quality of a decision model. While it is
certainly true that incorrect model parameters lead to incorrect model output, judging
the parameterizations as wrong because of the model performing badly would be logically
flawed (as it incorrectly reverses the implication).
Instead, the model validation must be up to long term studies with control groups,
followed by well-designed statistical tests to reject the hypothesis of the model perform-
ing identically to a chosen alternative. The goal of rejecting the hypothesis is crucial
here, since a statistical test can never be a formal proof, but only provide an empiri-
cal counterexample against some claim. Thus, to verify the claim of the here-proposed
method to be a useful risk decision supporting framework, we need to refute the claim
of it performing equal to a competing technique. This setting is very well known from
clinical studies incurs some challenges for risk management, since security incidents are
random events, and cannot be considered as independent or isolated from one another
(advanced persistent threats are only one hidden cause that can manifest itself in a
long sequence of seemingly independent but nevertheless cumulating events up to a final
catastrophe). Moreover, there are no such things as “lab conditions”, under which the
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effect of a decision can be tested against a different one. Thus, a control group in our
setting can only be another company, but incidents – particularly APTs – are focused
and tailored to the company, so comparing data from one company to that of another
is most likely not too meaningful, since incidents happen to both companies, but in
crucially different forms.
This substantiates the aforementioned long-run of studying the effects of one decision
making against another. Statistical tests are a natural tool here, but the selection of an
appropriate one requires care for several reasons:
1. Parametric tests come with assumptions on the distributions of the sample sets
under investigation. For example, assuming Gaussian distributions here could
be flawed, since we talk about losses that are typically modeled by heavy tailed
distributions.
2. The tested hypothesis must be considered relative to how the risk management
works. For example, tests on equality of means appear quite well-aligned to risk
management that minimizes expected damages, i.e. means. That is, if the al-
ternative risk management against which the proposed method is to be tested
considers only means (for example, if risk is defined as the product of likelihood
and impact), while our framework allows for a disregard of this quantity (since
the hyperreal ordering remains unchanged upon disregarding any finite number
of moments, which can include the first moment), the test may unintendedly be
biased towards favouring the alternative hypothesis.
Similar issues apply to the selection of the “control group”, because the benchmark
figures that an enterprise uses to measure its own performance may be highly different
between companies and may be highly specific for the business area. One benchmark
figure that may have wide applicability and – in the end of the day – may be the only
high-level figure that counts for risk management, is the number of severe incidents. This
number depends on the understanding of “severe”, and the threshold at which losses are
counted as severe can be defined individually for each enterprise.
Towards a method for validating our risk management decision framework, we will
thus refrain from specifying a particular risk threshold here, and go for verifying the
purely qualitative intuition that:
A good risk management framework should minimize the number of severe
incidents.
Consequently, to assess the “goodness” of the decision framework based on game theory,
the proposed procedure is as follows, for any particular (i.e., fixed) enterprise:
1. Define a control group: since data coming from a different company may be biased
and relate to different endo- and exogenous processes, the control group should be
the enterprise itself. This also fixes the risk management that we test our method
against, since it simply is the current decision making framework that we want to
judge against the new (here proposed) framework.
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2. Fix a meaning of “severe incident” in the sense of specifying a threshold above
which damages or losses count as severe. Given a series of historic records on
losses that occurred in the past, one can compile a past loss distribution Fpast,
and, for example, define the threshold using a quantile of Fpast. In any case, it
is important to fix this threshold a-priori (still, we need to bear in mind that
the thresholds may need adaption over the lifetime of the enterprise to remain
meaningful), and independently of the value implied by [36, Thm.2.14].(this is to
avoid a bias in favour of the here proposed decision making technique). Call the
threshold t0, and let us think of losses > t0 as being severe.
3. Collect the number n0 of incidents whose losses were ≥ t0, i.e., which have been
severe in this understanding. Based on the distribution Fpast of past losses, the
likelihood for such an incident to occur would be p = Pr(L ≥ t0), if L measures
the random loss. Assuming independence of events, the number N of severe past
incidents is Poisson-distributed with a rate parameter λpast that depends on p.
For the data collection as such, the independence assumption entails that common
underlying causes of seemingly independent events must be identified before feeding
this data into a test statistic. Several events with a single common cause must then
be compiled into a single event (representing the underlying cause) with a total loss
incurred. For example, if many events can be related to an APT, the typical nature
of these symptoms is to stay undetected, so they would probably not count into
the set of “severe” incidents. Nonetheless, if the APT manifests itself in several
quite severe damage events, then these must be considered as one single incident
(being the APT, only exhibiting multiple damages) with accumulated effects.
4. At some point in time, the new risk management framework (not necessarily the
one described in this report) becomes installed, and a new recording of “severe”
events (with the same definition as was used in the past) must start. Call the
number of these M , and observe that the new loss distribution Fnew is as well
Possonian with a rate parameter λnew, which depends on the mass p that Fnew
assigns to the region ≥ t0.
5. Fix equal time periods for data collection: For the new collection of losses, it is
crucial that the time period over which M was counted equals the period over which
N was taken. Otherwise, the test would be biased, since if the past period is much
shorter than the current one, then the number of past incidents is necessarily much
smaller than the number of current incidents. Likewise, if the past period was very
long, and the new period is relatively short, then the number of incidents N will
necessarily be much higher than the number M of currently observed incidents.
6. A final assumption that must nevertheless be emphasized is both rates λpast, λnew
being taken as constant over time (otherwise, the events would not be Poisson
distributed any more).
Given the past and current samples with sizes n and m, respectively, the distributions
of N and M are N ∼ Poisson(nλpast) and M ∼ Poisson(mλnew). The hypothesis to be
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refuted is the past risk management performing better or equal to the new method, in
which case the null hypothesis becomes
H0 :
λpast
λnew
≤ 1,
which expresses that the past risk management reduces severe incidents at least as good
as the current (new) one, hence the new risk management is no better than the previous.
The statistical test of choice is a one-sided rate ratio test [14, 29]. These references
discuss various methods to test Poisson rates, and one exact test is directly available in R
via the package rateratio.test [11,12], which can be invoked by issuing the command:
rateratio.test(c(n·λpast,m·λnew), c(m, n), alternative = "greater")
for our case. The null-hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is less than the pre-specified
1− α (that defaults to α =conf.level= 0.95 in the above call).
A general validation or verification of the method against competing ones is thus a
matter of several companies running long-time evaluations and deciding on their own
if the decision framework proposed here performs better or worse than their competing
candidate. Extending the investigation towards checking whether or not the stochas-
tic order makes up a good model of decision making under bounded rationality is an
independent challenge and widely extended line of research that we will not go farther
into here. Instead, the last test is meant to complete the theory developed here, and we
close the report by a discussion in favour of the qualitative advantages that this form of
decision making may offer for practitioners.
8 Conclusion and Outlook
The most important pros of the method can be roughly summarized as follows:
• No consensus problem: The approach of working with entire distributions rather
than single values avoids issues of consensus finding among experts. That is, if there
are disagreeing opinions among a group of people, every opinion goes into the risk
analysis at equal weight. Thus, nobody has to be overruled or otherwise accept a
compromise that deviates from the own thoughts. If, subsequently, damage occurs
nonetheless, arguments of people claiming to have foreseen this incident are useless,
since any such warning was considered from the beginning on already.
• Vague assessments allowed : Even for a single expert, there is no need to confine
oneself to a single risk assessment, perhaps at the risk of being mistakenly under-
stood as also saying what the risk “is not”. In other words, if a security expert
utters a risk of level “medium”, then this is not the implicit additional statement
that the risk is “not high”. In fact, in allowing the expert to add uncertainty
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to her/his assessment4, the intrinsic fuzziness of perceived security risks can be
(conveniently) expressed.
This degree of freedom also helps to treat scenarios in which several threats occur
jointly. If a threat scenario is such that most likely other attacks are mounted
along, then the expert may still focus on the “main objective” (main threat) of
the assessment, while explicitly stating and rating the possibility of more severe
damages upon the simultaneous occurrence of other threats by assigning some
likelihood to the other alternatives (cf. remark 3.1).
• Enforced systematization: The need to set up a game matrix for all combinations of
defenses and attacks enforces a systematic approach to the entire risk management
problem. The method itself is herein merely embedded and rests on a comprehen-
sive threat analysis and identification of countermeasures. The method of risk
assessment as outlined in section 3.3 is actually an application of crowdsourcing ;
see [3].
Perhaps the most important advantage over more conventional quantitative methods
of risk assessment is the following: none of the information items (except the average)
returned by the call sequences at the end of Section 6.4, can be obtained by standard
techniques of risk management that are entirely based on expected losses as risk. Hence,
the preservation of information throughout the entire process from the modeling up
to the final risk result interpretation is an important benefit over other methods. In
brief: the here proposed method is preserving information of all experts over the entire
risk management process, and avoids loss of information through consensus finding and
opinion or risk aggregation.
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